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HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INDIVZDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM AND
WORK (1)
Harry C. Triandis
University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign, IL. USA
(Paper prepared for the Values ~ Work Conference, Tilburg
University, Tilburg, The Netherlands, November 9-12, 1994).
Converging evidence suggests that the major ways cultures
differ in their attitudes, beliefs, norms, self-definitions,
and values is on collectivism and individualism (Triandis,
1988; 1989; 1993; Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988), which
can take two different forms (Triandis, 1995): horizontal
and vertical. In this paper I will present some of this
evidence, and draw the implications of these cultural
difference for understanding how work is conceived and
valued around the world.
Individualism and collectivism are cultural syndromes
(Triandis, 1993). That is, they are identified when speakers
of a particular lanquage, living in a specifiable geoqraphic
region, during a particular historic period share attitudes,
beliefs, cognitive structures, norms, role-definitions,
self-definitions, and values that are organized around a
central theme. In the case of collectivism the central theme
is the centrality of the collective; in the case of
individualism the theme is the centrality of the individual.
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INDZVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM
A review of the literature that discusses these concepts
(Triandis, 1995) suggested that there are four universal
attributes, and an unknown number (60 or so identified to
date) culture specific attributes, of individualism and
collectivism. The universal attributes are etics (i.e., can
be found in all cultures). The culture specific attributes
are emics (i.e., features that occur in one culture and may
not be found in other cultures). There is insufficient
research at this time to be sure that we know what is etic
and emic, so this distinction is provisional.
The attributes that are most likely universal:
1. The definition of the self as independent from or
interdependent with others, e.g., Markus b~ Kitayama, 1991;
aspects measured by scales developed by Singelis (in press),
Gudykunst et al. (1994), and others. Individualism goes with
the independent, and collectivism with the interdependent
definition of the self.
2. The primacy of personal or collective goals, found in
the discussion of the constructs by Triandis (1988, 1990),
and measured by Yamaguchi (1994). That is, when personal and
collective goals are in conflict, individualists value
solutions that give priority to personal goals, while
collectivists do the opposite.
3. The relative importance of attitudes and norms as
determinants of social behavior, across a wide sample of
behaviors and situations. A convenient way to measure the
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importance of norms and attitudes is to use the methodology
of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), with a wide sample of
behaviors. This was done by Bontempo b Rivero (1992) who
found that collectivists give more weight to norms than to
attitudes, while individualists qive more weight to
attitudes than to norms.
4. The relative importance of exchange or communal
relationships across situations commonly found in the
culture. This distinction was made by Mills ~ Clark (1982).
Exchange relationships are typical in the market place,
e.g., you do this job and I pay you so much, and are
emphasized in individualistic cultures. Communal
relationships are typical in the family, e.g., people
consider the other person's needs and goals, and social
behavior reflects taking into account such needs. Communal
relationships are found more frequently in collectivist
cultures.
While these four attributes are recognizable as
different from each other, their measurements correlate in
the .40 to .50 range (Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, Sinha, and
Iwao, submitted), suggesting the presence of a central core.
In addition to these four attributes, these cultural
syndromes may include many other attributes. We have
identified 60 additional attributes (Triandis, 1994), but we
are not sure that they are found in all collectivist or all
individualist cultures. Below you see two examples of these
60 attributes, that will suggest that there are different
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kinds of collectivism and individualism.
TWO EXAMPLES OF CULTURE SPECZFIC ATTRIBUTES
In many collectivist cultures ( e.q., Japan), ingroup
harmony is valued so highly that people avoid
confrontations, and lose face if they stir up trouble. In
other collectivist cultures, such as the Israeli kibbutz, it
is quite all right to argue.
In some collectivist cultures they value ingroup
homogeneity so much that they see the ingroup as more
homogeneous than the outgroup (Triandis, McCusker ~ Hui,
1990). But this may not be found in all collectivist
cultures. We need much more research to be sure.
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
Zndividualism and collectivism can take many forms. Each
form has distinct attributes. The 60 or so attributes
identified so far provide an extremely large number of types
of collectivism and individualism. However, the most
important types of individualism and collectivism refer to
the horizontal and vertical forms.
Zn the horizontal form, people are assumed to be basically
the same, or equal. In the vertical form, people are assumed
to be fundamentally unequal. In the horizontal form, people
value the equal distribution of resources, and when a
discrepancy occurs they do something to correct it. In the
vertical form, people tolerate or value situations of
unequal distribution, such as equity (the more one
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contributes the more one gets), and accept without
questioninq inequalities in power (that is the way the world
is) .
MEASUREMENT OF THESE CONSTRUCTS
The empirical investigation of these value patterns
requires the development of scales that measure them
emically in each culture, but are related to the
theoretically stated etic attributes. We have made some
progress in developing such scales, but the research program
is really in its early phases. Both attitude and value
items, as well as other methods have been used to tap
individualism and collectívism (e.g., Triandis, McCusker á~
Hui, 1990; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk ~ Gelfand, submitted).
Others have also measured the construct with their own
methods (e.g., Oeserman, 1993).
BEHAVIOR AND VALUES
There is no one-on-one relationship between the value
patterns included in these syndromes and behavior, because
behavior is a function of culture, personality, and the
situation. In fact, in most cases, the personality times
situation term accounts for more variance than any of the
other terms (Cronbach, 1975). Some situations call for
collectivist responses, as suggested by the next overhead:
Overhead 1
CONVERGENCE WITH THE WORK OF OTHERS
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The four value patterns of horizontal - vertical ~
individualism - collectivism correspond to the work of Fiske
(1990, 1992) and Rokeach (1973).
Fiske distinquishes four types of social relationships,
shown in the following overheads:
Fiske Overheads
Rokeach linked work on values with work on political
systems.
Rokeach Overhead
Summarizing these relationships we have:
Vertical and Horizontal
individualism-collectivism
These patterns can be seen also in the work of Shalom
Schwartz (1992, 1994):
Schwartz pattern overhead





We have used several other methods to study collectivism
(e.g., Triandis, McCusker ~ Hui, 1990), such as the
perception of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity, the
perception of the appropriateness of social behavior, and
the definition of the self as incorporating many or few
social elements. The last is done by asking Ss to complete
20 statements that begin with "I am..." Content analyses
show that the collectivists provide more social identity
responses (called S responses) than do individualists.
gS overheads
THE UTILITY OF THESE CONSTRUCTS IN STUDIES OF WORK BEHAVIOR
The literature includes a number of examples of the use of
the collectivism-individualism framework to understand work
behavior. Perhaps the most important is the work of Erez á~
Earley (1993), which deals with a wide range of work-related
phenomena, such as selection, training, motivation,
promotion, and the like. Earley has conducted a number of
studies in China, and is even getting into the meaning of
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Chinese terms, like the term for "face" (Earley, 1994). In
the Handbook of Industrial and Organi2atíonal Psychology,
Volume 4, there are a number of chapters written by
colleagues from or about collectivist cultures (Erez, 1994;
Kashima ~ Callan, 1994; Redding, Norman ~ Schlander, 1994;
Zhong-Ming Wang, 1994; Sinha, 1994) that provide rich
detail.
Work values of special importance in Horizontal
Individualism are: approximately equal pay no matter what
the job level, autonomy, initiative, opportunity for
personal growth.
In the case of Vertical Individualism, values such as to
each according to contribution, prestige, recognition,
promotíon, special privileges for individuals who do well
will be especially important.
In the case of Horizontal Collectivism, pay that takes
into account the worker's needs, having nice co-workers,
being supported by the organization, job security, having
safe work conditions will be especially important values.
In the case of Vertical Collectivism, values such as
obedience to superiors, charisma, paternalism, noblesse
oblige, will be emphasized.
ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF THE VALUES AND WORK CONFERENCE
I now ask: What are the implications of these syndromes
for work behavior? I will answer this question, by
examining the five questions that the organizers of this
symposium mailed to us with their invitation to participate.
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First, they asked us to examine: What is the overall
structure of values and which position do work-related
values take in it. Clearly, my answer is that the overall
structure reflects horizontal and vertical individualism and
collectivism, and work-related values are linked to this
structure.
I think the work of Ronen (1994) is useful here, because
it shows empirically that work values are structured on an
individualism-collectivism axis. The next overheads show the
value pattern he proposes. In addition, we can state that in
vertical cultures, where unequal power is accepted, we can
expect that people will value both "obeying" and "ordering
to do something." In horizontal cultures both of these
concepts would be rejected.
Ronen overheads
2. Which differences and similarities exist between nations
with regard to work related values?
Here I must start by worrying about the use of nations in
this question. Nations are heterogeneous entities. Value
patterns will be related to national entities very
approximately. In fact, social class, religion, and other
demographics may be more important determinants of value
patterns than nation. Nevertheless, I admit that practical
considerations concerned with data collection make all of
10
us use nations as the first approximation.
However, we should check whether the within nation
variance is larqer than the between nations variance in our
studies. If it is larger, we should de-emphasize nation, and
identify other variables that are more important. I suspect
that situations will be the most powerful variable.
My current thinking about the measurement of Horizontal-
Vertical, Individualism-Collectivism is that they should be
measured across situations. People have in their cognitive
systems all the elements that correspond to the four
patterns, but use them more of less frequently across
situations. Thus, the measurement requires the presentation
of scenarios, and a multiple-choice format that reflects the
four patterns. A person who selects more vertical
individualist answers, is a vertical individualist, and so
on.
For example, when I took my own test I was a Horizontal
Individualist ( HI) 37~ of the time across situations, a
horizontal collectivist (HC) 27~ of the time, a vertical
individualist (VI) 23~ of the time, and a vertical
collectivist ( VC) 13~ of the time. Thus, I am a 60-40
Zndividualist-Collectivist. But the sample of situations
that is used in such a test largely determines the results.
I am not convinced that I used a representative sample of
situations, and I am now working on the development of a
better sample of situations.
If we average these percentages of VI, VC, HI, and HC,
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across individuals, within our national sample, we would
arrive at a profile for a particular sample of individuals
(e.g., a nation). I would expect, for instance, Germany to
be Vertical Individualist, perhaps 35~ of the time, but also
Horizontal Individualist, perhaps 25~ of the time, and
Vertical Collectivist, perhaps 20á of the time, and
Horizontal Collectivist, perhaps 20~ of the time. In short,
I am quessing that the "dominant form" will be Vertical
Individualism, but the other forms will also appear.
Examples of horizontal individualism will be nations such
as The Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, and Norway.
Examples of vertical individualism, will be England, the
USA, Canada, France, Germany, and most Western democracies.
Examples of vertical collectivism would be found in Japan,
Korea, China, India.
Examples of horizontal collectivism would be found in the
Israeli kibbutz, among the Eskimos, and in many of the
hunting-and-gathering people who live in environments where
survival is difficult.
An important point: Culture can be inferred to be present
when there is relatively little variability across
individuals. For example, language, the central feature of
culture, shows relatively little variability (if you compare
it with, say, which spouse does the dishes in a western
culture). When the variability is large, factors other than
culture must be operating. These could include genetic
factors, differences in ecology, history, etc. that create
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individual differences. Thus, if we line up all the
individuals in a culture, and look at the percent of the
time they are, say, Vertical Individualists across
situations, if the percentage is plus or minus 10~ it is
culture; if it is plus or minus 20~ it may no longer be an
attribute of culture.
I think the importance of the situation needs to be
emphasized even more. In many family-like situations one
will find collectivism; in most situations of competition we
will find vertical emphases; in numerous situations of
cooperation, or having a good time ( e.g., at a social
gathering) we will find horizontal emphases; in most market-
like situations we will find individualism. Also, even very
collectivist individuals will be collectivists only within
their ingroups and act quite individualistically (e.g., be
quite indifferent to the suffering of others) when they are
dealing with their outgroups. In short, the sample of
situations we consider--ingroup~outgroup, family,
competition, cooperation, market-- will produce different
results when we measure these qualities.
Some activities are inherently competitive ( e.g., sports)
and other activities are inherently cooperative (e.g.,
buyinq from a wholesaler to sell to the members of a club).
Some situations are like in a family, and others like in a
market. An important point is that we develop habits that
reflect our exposure to situations. When we are raised in
competitive situations, we are likely to "convert" all
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situations into competitions. Collectivists tend to convert
most situations into family-relationships (e.g., the
paternalism of the Japanese supervisor, see Kashima ~
Callan, 1994), and individualists tend to convert most
situations into markets (e.q., parents pay a child to do
chores in the home).
The relation of values to behavior is generally too weak
to be of interest, when values are measured out of context.
It is only when we measure them in context that we can
predict behavior. In other words, to predict behavior we
need to specify the time, place, and who the actors are in
the particular situation. If we specify these parameters,
and then ask a question such as "In this situation would you
do that?" we would be able to predict very well (Fishbein ~
Ajzen, 1975). One of the best predictors is to ask: "Are you
the kind of person who would do this and that situation?"
(Triandis, 1980).
We should not limit ourselves to studies of values, but
should supplement them with studies of beliefs, attitudes
and norms, and look for convergence across our measurements
of these entities. Granted, that requires a lot more work,
but I argue that if we only study values we can slip into a
trap: we might assume that every distinction in our data is
reflecting some important reality, when the distinction in
fact never shows up in other behaviors.
Another important point is that values are dynamic and in
flux. For example, the value of equality is high in American
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political life ( e.g., one man one vote), but it does not get
activated when many white Americans deal with the racial
issue. The argument that they favor equality of opportunity
but do not favor equality of outcomes, reflects vertical
individualism. Thus, one has Myrdal's (1944) American
dilemma, which has persisted for decades in some segments of
American society.
Americans are often anti-authoritarian--see the way they
criticize every President. Yet, economic determinism makes
them obey authoritarian bosses in job situations. There are
numerous examples of Vice Presidents of the big three auto-
makers behaving regally and getting way with it. In short,
in political situations they are usually horizontal; in many
economic situations they are vertical.
3. How do work related values develop over time? To what
degree do values of different nations and groups converge or
diverge? To what degree can apparent changes be attributed
to inter-generational differences?
My way of thinking is that the ecology makes people act
in certain ways. The actions that get rewarded become
reflected in the values that people have. A central
difference between individualism and collectivism is self-
direction. If the ecology forces people to cooperate under
the direction of a strong leader ( e.g., they need to
construct an irrigation canal, and that can only be done if
100,000 people work together; see China in the 15th Century)
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self-direction is low, and vertical collectivism is high. If
a strong leader is not needed, e.g., individual hunters are
as successful as group hunters, horizontal collectivism
will emerge. If the ecology forces people to work alone,
e.g., writing a book is usually a solitary activity, self-
direction is high, and individualism will emerge. The
classic entrepreneur works in a garage, tinkering with a new
product that can be mass produced and result in great
wealth. If the ecology forces competition, some people will
get to the top and others will stay behind, and that will
lead to vertical individualism. If distinguishing people is
not ideologically defensible (e.g., as in a democracy) and ~
or does not pay (e.g., creates too many dissatisfied
people), members of the culture adopt simplifications such
as "one person one vote" and then horizontal individualism
will flourish.
One of the major factors associated with individualism is
affluence. Correlations of the order of .80, reported by
Hofstede (1980), support this point. The more affluent do
not need their ingroups. They can do their own thing and get
away with it. Other factors include more differentiation in
the culture, social structure, religion, etc. which means
that individuals have to decide for themselves what kind of
identity to acquire. The more people decide for themselves
what to do, the more individualistic is the culture. Since
many nations are becoming more affluent, they also are
becoming more individualistic (e.g., in the last 10 years
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the divorce rate has increased enormously in Singapore; it
is now about 20~ of the U.S. rate. Singapore has had to pass
a law requirinq children to take care of their elderly
parents!).
In fact, I speculate that major aspects of the ecology are
related to individualism and collectivism the way it is
shown in the next overhead:
relationship among syndromes
Horizontal structures will be found mostly in ecologies
where equality pays and competition does not. One sees much
horizontality in cultures that survive in difficult
ecologies, such as deserts and the arctic, where competition
may result in individuals perishing, and then the survival
of the group may be threatened. Conversely, vertical
structures will emerge in ecologies where competition is
desirable, resources are scarce and must be obtained by
struggling. Those who lose the competition may perish, but
that will not threaten necessarily the survival of the
group.
On the issue of converqence I think the situation is very
much more complicated than these statements would suggest.
For example, as cultures change, people sometimes become
nostalgic about the old cultural forms, and may react by
showing ethnic affirmation--going back to growing their own
tomatoes, instead of buying them in the super-market! The
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Muslim world is showing ethnic affirmation with the emphasis
on fundamentalism, and that is a reaction to Western
individualism. They see their societies as collectives under
the direction of religious authorities. People are expected
to do what the mullahs determine. The Western viewpoint is
that people can dress as they want, and need not pay
attention to the authorities. The fact that the mullahs are
losinq power, when societies become secular, motivates them
to resist vigorously the influence of the West. Thus, in
that case I see divergence. But convergence and divergence
will occur in specific times and places, and there will be a
battle between them in different activities. Airline pilots
and jet-setters will converge; poets and philosophers will
diverge.
Rogers (1983) has provided a useful analysis of
innovations. People will change their values if that pays.
For example, in India untouchables convert to Buddhism or
Christianity to relinquish the stigma of untouchability.
Furthermore, values will change when the change is not
enormous. It is easier for a European to become American,
than it is for an African to do so. It is easier for a
person from an agricultural-simple culture to adapt to an
industrial culture than it is for a hunter to do so. During
acculturation, people are more likely to select the
observable than the unobservable elements of the new
culture.
Historic events are also very important. Individualists,
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and let us face it, most of us here are individualists,
underemphasize history. We can't imagine why in Bosnia they
. fight over spilled blood that has been dry for hundreds of
years. Yet that is a very important factor. For example,
look at the way different minorities are absorbed in
American society. The "voluntary minorities," i.e., those
that came on their own, are thrivinq. The top winners of
awards in the arts and sciences have Vietnamese, Chinese,
and Japanese names. The Cubans are doing extremely well. But
the "involuntary minorities" (African-Americans; American-
Indians; Puerto Ricans; Chicanos whose ancestors were
conquered by the U.S. in 1848) are conspicuous by their
absence from the top of the social structure. This is not
accidental.
It may be that part of difference in the way these
minorities adapt reflects "cultural distance" (e.g.,
certainly American Indians were hunters, and that life style
does not fit well into a city), including distance due to
social class. But there seems to be an additional factor.
Ogbu (1994) argues that the main factor is that the
involuntary minoritíes use an "oppositional framework" which
says "if the majority values X, I will hate X). I came
across a study that found that 35~ of African-American
individuals in leadership positions agreed with the
statement that the "AIDS epidemic was organized by whites to
get rid of blacks. It is a form of genocide." That
certaintly indicates an oppositional framework!
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You will not qet convergence under these conditions!
Obviously, we are getting diverqence: the underclass is
qetting more different.
There is some association between generation and values.
Children start by being vertical collectivists. They soon
become (during adolescence, in the West) horizontal
individualists. As they join work settings, they moderate
their individualism so they will be acceptable by their
supervisors, and as they grow old they become collectivists
again. Noricks et al (1987) found that those over 56 years
old, in a California community, were more collectivist than
individualist. this could reflect the greater collectivism
of a previous generation of Americans, or it maybe a
phenomenon we see in all societies. Future research should
look into the possibility that shifts toward collectivism
occur with age in all societies.
4. How do work values relate to performance and other
outcomes of peoples' work activity?
Values are most interesting at the cultural level, and
predict mainly at the cultural level. In short, one can look
at the values of the culture, and predict divorce rates,
national expenditures to equalize family income and the
like. However, values are usually distal variables for the
prediction of individual behavior. To predict at the
individual level, you need a different set of variables,
such as personal habits, personal beliefs about what
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significant others want you to do, self-concepts, feelings
about the particular behavior, and perceived consequences of
carrying out the behavior (Triandis, 1977, 1980). Studies
that used models with such variables have received
considerable support ( e.q., Bauman, Brown, Fontana, ~
Cameron, 1993).
However, I have recently modified my thinking, to argue
(Triandis, 1994) that values, while they are distal they are
not irrelevant, because they provide frameworks for the
"interpretation of events" which means that we can
understand better why a person looks at a particular
situation and sees it as requiring cooperation and another
person looks at the same situation and sees it as involving
competition.
In this case, I think, Helson's ( 1964) level of
adaptation is very useful. That is, depending on the
frequency distribution of events in one's environment, the
level of adaptation ( e.g., the neutral point that divides
what is viewed as competitive from what is viewed as
cooperative)., will be different. In a competitive
environment, the level of adaptation is "high": i.e. events
with minimal levels of competition are seen as relatively
cooperative. In a cooperative environment, the level of
adaptation will be "low", i.e. most events will be seen as
competitive. Thus, the very same event that is seen as
cooperative in the competitive environment will be seen as
competitive in the cooperative environment.
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The way the variables of the attitude-behavior models
operate, reflects values indirectly, in the sense that
values sometimes shift the level of adaptation. For example,
if you come from a culture where respect for elders is very
high, and you are the Prime Minister, you may need to avoid
your mother (as was the case of Mobutu, in Africa) because
she might tell you to do something (e.g., who to appoint as
Foreiqn Minister!) that is quite unacceptable, and you
cannot disobey her. The level of adaptation for accepting-
rejecting the advice of a mother, makes almost all the
advice acceptable, in some parts of Africa. But among
American teenagers, the level of adaptation is at a
different point and that makes most advice rejectable.
There is one other place where values are useful. If we
look at the convergence of the values of two individuals
(e.g., supervisor and subordinate) it does increase the ease
of communication, and that results in higher job
satisfaction (e.g., Gelfand, Radhakrishnan, Kuhn, ~ Triandis
1994). We can look also at these convergencies more broadly:
corporate values and individual values, peer-peer values,
middle-management and top-management values, and the like. I
suspect that one of the secrets of Japanese success is that
they provide to their employees several months of value
socialization training, which results in similar values
(Kashima ~ Callan, 1994). Interaction is a lot easier when
people have similar values. In many situations it is not
necessary to consult another person, because you know what
22
the other person would say.
5. Which are the major methodological problems of
comparative and lonqitudinal value research, and which
solutions have been found to circumvent them?
One problem is the representativeness of values. We do
want to include in our measurements values that are
important in all the cultures and time periods we are
investigating. A typical way to do that is to ask focus
groups, or co-investigators, to add values to the
inventories we construct, so we will include the emic values
of all the relevant cultures.
However, recently I started worrying about the adequacy
of this procedure. I wonder if people can really tell what
their values are. Specifically, I noted that I discover
features of my culture only when I come in touch with other
cultures. If we do not have a way to confront people with
their emic "anti-values", I wonder if they will be able to
tell us what their emic values really are. I suspect that a
different methodology is needed. It will have to be much
more ethnographic--participant observations by people from
outside the culture who know the local language. This is
expensive, so it may well remain as an ideal that will only
be approximated in a few cases.
The use of multimethod procedures to measure values, and
convergence across methods, is also very important. There
are some good examples of this in the literature already,
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but we should be bolder in thinking about methods. For
example, the use of both operant (e.g., presentation of a
stimulus such as a picture, or the beqinning of a sentence,
to which the subjects can qive many responses) and
respondent methods (e.g., presentation of a statement, to
which the subjects qive a true~false response) (McClelland,
1980), should be encouraged. Convergence in the findings




constructs seem useful in understanding work behavior, but a
number of limitations can be identified, and a number of
improvements in theory and method can be made.
Especially important is the linking of these cultural
syndromes with behavior, and their multimethod measurement.
I am convinced that mono-method measurements in cross-
cultural settings are likely to suggest differences among
cultures that reflect the way Ss in particular cultures give
meaning to a method, rather than real differences that
reflect important attributes of the cultures. Only if we
have convergence across methods can we be sure that we are
looking at a"real" cultural syndrome, on which cultures
will vary. Thus, I believe we should not limit ourselves to
the study of values, but look for convergence across studies
of beliefs, attitudes, values, norms, and behaviors. In
24
short, we should study cultural syndromes.
Hopefully, our discussions in Tilburg will suggest
additional improvements.
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OV~RHEADI
SITUATIONS THAT INCREASE THE PR08A81UTY OF SAMPUNG THE
COLLECTMS7 POLE
Group experiences extemal threat-common fate ia very clear.
Important accepted authorities have advocated group action-~.g.. war
Group membership improves status oi the individual-or increases sense
of identlty~ security~ power, control of the social environment
Resource extraction is faciiitated through cooperation within group
There aro few options tor reaching valuable goals as an individual
Conformity to group in the past resulted in rewards
Group membership has been stable
The group is homogeneous~eviations from norn~s were punished-
group's traditions emphasized coliectivism
Socialization agents emphasized group nwrnbership
Actor teeis as a representative of the gr~oup
Actor has intemalized group norrns (Brazil study~
The other person in the social situaHon is a coilectivist and the actors
wants to get along with that penson
r~sxE ov~xxE~s ~
ATTRIBUTES OF F1SKE'S FOUR ORIENTATIONS
COMMUNAL SHARING
Sense of belong to the group
Thinking ~re" more than "I"
Shared identity
Fear of isolation, loneliness
To each according to need
Many for love
Relationships are "etemal"
Gifts given even when not reciprocated
Intimacy in social behavior
Nurturance, altruism, caring, selflessness, generosity,sharing, concem for
others
Ingroup favoritism and hostility toward outgroup-racism, genocide
Work is collective responsibility
Land belongs to all and is sacnad
Decisions via consensus,
Self is relational and includes group identities
AUTHORITY RANKING
Emphasis on hierarchy, status, power; precedence in walking, seating
arrangements
Many for status
Top person gives large gifts; noblesse oblige
Respect, deference, loyaity, obedience are common
Punishment of the impertinent
To each according to status
Land ís owned by king or equivalent
Ident~cation witfi leader ("YNe die for the queen, king")
Misfortunea indicate that the leader has lost the mandate of heaven
Wars extend the authority of the king or equivalent
Self is exalted or humble; inequality is "natural"
EQUAUTY MATCHING
Reciprocity, equality, distribute equally, give gifts of equal value,
justice~equality
Woric is shared equally
Land is divided equally
Many equal
Altemate in going through doors
To each equally
One person one vote
Self is like every other self
Misfortunes should be equally distributed
An eye for an eye, revenge, are "natural" ways to deal with others
MARKET PRICING
Social relations are anafyzed according to "profit" and "loss"
Marry for money
To each according to contribution-equity
Gifts according to contribution to the relationship
Achievement, do own thing, everything has a price,
Assessment by percentages (e.g., taxes~
Work per unit of time; rate of retum per unit of time emphasized
Land is an investment
The market decides
Self is defined by one's occupation
Greatest good to the greatest number
Mercantile wars, exploitation of workers, computation of kill ratios
ROKEACH OVERHEAD ~j
ROKEACH VALUES AND ~OLITICAL REGIMES
Low on Freedom High on Freedom
~igh on Equality Communiarn Social Democracy









Kind of Self Interdependent Independent
Different from Others
~ Fiske Communal Marlcet
Orientation Sharing t Pricing f
Authority Authority
Ranking Ranking
Rokeach Low Equality Low Equality
Values Low Freedom High Freedom
Political Comrnunalism Marlcet
















High Equality High Equality
Low Fr~dorn High Fnedom
Communal pe~~ic
Living Socialism
(e.g., ths tsraeli (s.g., Swsde~.
kibbutz) 8ritish Labor Part~







ATTITUDE TTEMS OVERHEAD ~
EXAMPLES OF HORIZONTAL INDIVIDUALISM ITEMS Alpha- .67
t often do "my own thing"
I prefer to be direct and forthright when discussing with people.
I am a unique individual
VERTICAL INDMDUALISM ITEMS Alpha- .74
It annoys me when other peopte perform better than I do
Competition ia the law of nature
When another person does better than 1 do, I get tense and aroused
HORIZONTAL COLLECTIVISM Alpha - .68
The well being of my co-workers is important to me
tt is important to maintain harmony with my group.
I feel good when I cooperate with others.
VERTICAL COLLECTIVISM Alpha - .TO
I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not
approve of it.
I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activíty.
Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.
Correlates: Horizontal individualism correlates with rationalism (no
religion)
Vertícal individualism correlates negatively with Buddhism
Vertical collectivism correlates negatively with rationalism, and
Islam
SCENARIOS OV~;RHEpD l ,~
EXAMPLE OF SCENARIO ITEM
Which is the most important factor in an employee's promotion, assuming
that all other factors such as tenure and perfon~nance are equal?
Employee
A. is loyal to the corporation (horizontal collectivism)
B. is obedient to the instructions of management (vertical collectivism)
C. is able to think for himl herself (horizontal individualism)
D. has contributed to the corporation much in the past (vertical
individualism)
9bS OVBRHEADS
1~ZEANS OF q S IN INDIVIDUALISTIC SAMPLES
U. of Illinois Students N-509 19q
U. of Athens, Greece N-118 15 q
U. of Hawaii, European
background Students N-28 21 q
N. Z. White High
School S~tudents N-40 11 ~
N. Z. White adults N-16 17 ~ó
Cook Islanders born
in New Zealand N-16 209ó
U. of I. students N-24 23 `~ (think common)
07 ~ó (think different)
~s ovERHE~ws ~'L
MEANS OF qo S IN COLLECTIVIST SAMPLES
U. of Hawaii students N-19 29 qo
(Chinese background)
U. of Hawaii students N- 37 28 q
(Japanese background)
People's Republic N-34 52qo
of China
Rarotonga (S . Pacific) N-48 27 qo
N. Z. Cook Islanders N-28 31 qo
U. of I. students with -
Chinese names N-18 52 qo (think common)
30q (think different)
RONEN OVERHEADS l ~
FIGURE 10
Two-dimensional Plot of Work Ontcomes Importance
Using ALSCAL Algorithm of Israeli Sample ( n -186)
(Youn~s S- stress - 0.22; Kruskal's stress - 0.21)
~ Interest
~ Pay
F~om 'A Mulbvanase Appeoad~ bWort Vdra A Tw FaaaO ANivns" bv 5. Ranen and s. Barkan, 1985. Israel
Raaauch qretusr. 7d wvrv Uwvan~ty.
FIGURE 11
The Dimensions and Their Combined
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